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Soviet Policies in Southern Africa

National Intelligence Estimate

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SOVIET POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Information available as of 13 February 1985 was used in the preparation of this Estimate, which was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence Board on that date.

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The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

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CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
SCOPE NOTE	1
KEY JUDGMENTS	3
DISCUSSION	9
Soviet Involvement in Southern Africa	10
Angola	12
Soviet Views on UNITA	13
Relations With SWAPO and the ANC	14
Mozambique	14
Elsewhere in Southern Africa	15
Zimbabwe	15
Zambia	15
Botswana and Lesotho	15
South Africa	16
Disinformation and Propaganda	16
Regional Developments and Likely Soviet Responses:	
The Next 18 Months	17
Angola	17
The Cuban Factor	17
In Mozambique	19
Possible Openings in Zimbabwe and Zambia	19
Scenarios With SWAPO and the ANC	19
Outlook and Implications for the United States	20

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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses Moscow's current policies in southern Africa, the variables which may shape those policies, and the USSR's likely response to various changes and developments over the coming 12 to 18 months. Specifically, it examines:

- Soviet objectives in southern Africa.
- Moscow's response to the military and diplomatic challenge posed by Pretoria, particularly as the challenge affects Angola and Mozambique.
- Moscow's likely response to scenarios that could develop in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and with regional insurgent groups.


The Estimate also discusses the implications of regional developments for the United States. Although this paper discusses Soviet ties to opposition groups in South Africa, it does not examine the domestic situation there or the likelihood of change in South Africa.

For the purposes of the Estimate, "southern Africa" is defined as including the following countries: Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa.

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Southern Africa: A Regional Perspective

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Recent developments in southern Africa pose the greatest challenge to Moscow's position there since the USSR's major entry in the area in the mid-1970s. The USSR's key objectives in southern Africa over the next 18 months are:

- To ensure its continued influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique.
- To preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.
- To prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia dominated by the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO).
- To undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.
- To encourage black African suspicions of South African and US "perfidy."

The Soviets realize, however, that they have a limited ability to influence events in southern Africa. Moscow appears increasingly concerned that it could be excluded from a regional settlement in Namibia, much as it was in the Lancaster House talks on Rhodesian independence. A significant further diminution of tensions between South Africa and Angola or Mozambique would reduce Luanda's or Maputo's need for additional Soviet military assistance, Moscow's key instrument of influence building. Such setbacks in turn could undermine Soviet efforts to support Namibian and South African insurgents. Diplomatic solutions and reduced security tensions strike at the heart of Soviet vulnerabilities—Moscow's failure to provide significant levels of economic assistance and its inability to play an active and positive role in a regional settlement that includes South Africa.

Moscow's position in southern Africa will continue to depend primarily on the USSR's arms relationships with Angola, Mozambique, and regional insurgent groups. Angola will remain Moscow's main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials clearly state that Moscow has more credibility at stake in Angola than in Mozambique and that the USSR is in for the long haul in Luanda. In Angola, Moscow's objectives

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continue to be well served by the presence of some 30,000 to 35,000 Cuban military personnel who help to prop up the besieged regime. Military and economic assistance accords also have enabled Moscow, its East European allies, and Cuba to establish a large advisory presence in the region, including some 2,500 military advisers and 13,000 economic technicians, most of whom are in Angola and Mozambique. Moreover, since 1983, the Soviets have delivered some \$1.4 billion in military assistance and since 1982 some \$430 million in economic assistance, and Cuban combat forces have been augmented by 5,000 troops. Soviet influence is further buttressed by political and ideological accords with the ruling parties in Angola and Mozambique.

The Soviets probably believe that South African intransigence will undermine the recent diplomatic gains engineered by the United States, and that the continuing South African-supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique will sustain the need for Soviet military and security assistance.

The Soviets—whatever the fate of current negotiations—also probably will seek to maintain leverage by ensuring a continued Cuban troop presence in Angola. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) leadership is likely to be susceptible to Soviet arguments that such a presence is needed to guard against US and South African perfidy, to protect the MPLA against insurgent attacks by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and to train Angolan forces in the use of Soviet weaponry.

Should prospects for a negotiated settlement that included a Namibian settlement and Cuban troop withdrawal become more likely in the next 18 months—one of several scenarios—we believe the Soviets, as they have done in the past, would try to derail it. Ultimately, however, we believe that Moscow would accede to Luanda's wishes for a settlement, working behind the scenes to maintain influence with the MPLA by encouraging Angola's suspicions of Washington's and Pretoria's motives, maintaining a Cuban troop presence, and continuing to supply military weapons. Given the inherent uncertainty of coups, we believe Moscow would be unlikely to encourage a coup by MPLA hardliners.

Under these circumstances, Moscow would seek to make the best of a bad situation. It would claim that Namibian independence represented a victory for the USSR and Cuba. The Soviets presumably would seek to ensure MPLA dominance in the coalition with UNITA and to expand their contacts with at least the MPLA faction in the coalition. They would try to protect their military access to facilities in Angola, to retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA to retain

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at least a core Cuban presence of at least 5,000 troops. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independent Namibia—assuming a SWAPO electoral win—in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

We believe that the Soviets, faced with a continuing deterioration in the MPLA's position vis-a-vis UNITA and/or South Africa, with no prospect of a decisive shift in the military balance, would find their options were limited and that Moscow would continue its current tack of bolstering Angola's defense capabilities.

A steady or more rapid deterioration of the country's economic infrastructure would create serious problems for the MPLA and its Soviet patrons. The MPLA could face a crisis in confidence within the local populace, if confronted with increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key economic sectors, such as the Cabinda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these circumstances, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combat sabotage activity.

A dramatic military shift in UNITA's favor within the next 18 months, however, probably would force the Soviets to urge the Cubans to assume a more direct role in the fighting as well as to request that additional Cuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moscow would be likely to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such as MI-24/25 Hinds and fighter aircraft, in an attempt to reestablish a military equilibrium. The Soviets probably would also increase their advisory presence and play a larger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations.

A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead the Soviets to respond—as they have in the past—with an upgrading and strengthening of Angolan defense capabilities. The Soviets also would seize the occasion to mount a massive propaganda campaign aimed at exposing South African and US perfidy. They would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime.

A final decision by Moscow on how far it is prepared to go in supporting the MPLA regime probably has yet to be made. Comments from Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not believe Angola is of such importance as to warrant the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover, whatever importance Moscow attaches to Angola, it probably realizes that only massive numbers of Soviet forces

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could decisively alter the military balance and even then—as Afghanistan has proved—such actions could not guarantee the defeat of UNITA forces.¹

In Mozambique, the Soviets are unlikely to write off a government dominated by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), although they have been dismayed by the extent of President Machel's accommodation with South Africa. Although they have considerably less ability to influence events in Maputo than in Luanda, the Soviets will seek to exploit Machel's frustration over the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency and his continued need for military assistance. Despite Machel's turn to the West, for example, Moscow has continued previously contracted arms deliveries.

Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati Accord with South Africa will break down. Soviet propaganda will continue to focus on the "bankruptcy" of the accord and allegations of continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time, Moscow hopes that the continuing military challenge from the insurgency will strengthen hardline elements in FRELIMO and cause Machel to reverse his commitment to Nkomati.

As Machel seeks to expand ties to South Africa, the West, and China, the Soviets are likely to pressure him by encouraging hardline elements within FRELIMO and disparaging his leadership to other black African leaders. Moscow, however, probably recognizes that dramatic changes—such as the ouster of Machel by party hardliners—might benefit RENAMO and lead Pretoria to renew economic and military pressures on Maputo. This in turn could prompt requests by Mozambique for major new military and economic aid commitments from the USSR. We do not believe that Moscow is any more willing than in the past to meet Maputo's immediate economic needs or to subsidize its long-term development programs.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets will try to foment and exploit new tensions that will undermine South African and US diplomacy and sustain the struggle against white minority rule in Pretoria. The Soviets will seek to channel additional assistance to the Namibian and South African insurgents whenever possible, though this would be increasingly difficult without Angolan and Mozambican cooperation.

¹ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Moscow has not ruled out a more direct Soviet military role in Angola, although the USSR probably would stop short of sending Soviet ground combat forces. In his view, if additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms and advisers were unable to halt a further deterioration of the MPLA's military situation, and its survival became seriously threatened, the chances of additional Soviet intervention—possibly including air, air defense, or military security forces—would increase. If undertaken, such action would be intended not to defeat the opposition militarily but to show Moscow's commitment, to free up additional Angolan/Cuban forces for combat, and to exert pressure on the parties involved to reach a political settlement.

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The Soviets will seek to exploit any openings in Zimbabwe stemming from a deteriorating security situation or South African meddling. While President Mugabe would not overcome his general distrust of the USSR, such problems could enhance the appeal of Soviet arms. Similarly, Moscow will continue to try to exploit resentment in Zambia, Botswana, and Lesotho about South African pressures to reach accommodations.

The Soviets will continue to use propaganda and disinformation in their efforts to retain influence. Such efforts will attempt to play on black African fears of Pretoria and to portray the United States and South Africa as partners seeking to impose solutions upon southern African states.

The pressing economic problems of the black African states will continue to work against long-term Soviet efforts to solidify their influence in the region. Moscow's failure to provide meaningful economic and developmental assistance will hamper its efforts to limit South Africa's and the West's roles in the area, and could open new opportunities for expanded Western and US influence.

Any US diplomatic successes also will heighten black African expectations. Washington, for example, will face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and to expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of the United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new opportunities, as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

Black Africans will look to the West for increased economic assistance. Greater economic involvement with the West could lead Angola and Mozambique to adopt a more truly nonaligned posture, further reducing Soviet influence. However, the political and ideological accords and continued security ties to the USSR are extensive and will assure the Soviets some degree of presence and influence. Short of the demise of the MPLA or FRELIMO governments, this relationship with Moscow is unlikely to change dramatically unless Western powers are willing to provide—on a par with and at competitive terms—the military and security aid currently provided by Moscow, or are successful in reducing the need for such aid.

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DISCUSSION

1. Southern Africa remains important to Moscow's image as a global superpower, although it is largely peripheral to core Soviet security interests and of lower priority than, for example, South Asia and the Middle East. Angola, in particular, is a symbol of the USSR's capability and willingness to extend its influence to distant shores. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975-76—coming as it did on the heels of Washington's recognition of Moscow's military parity and equal superpower status during the 1972 US-Soviet summit accords—symbolized Moscow's emergence as a global power asserting its claims to the rights and perquisites of superpower status. At the same time, Soviet actions in Angola reflected an element of opportunism in Soviet calculations, as Moscow moved to exploit the openings afforded by the collapse of the Portuguese empire.

2. Modern Soviet policy in Africa has evolved since Moscow's initial involvement in the late 1950s and is now aimed at achieving a number of broad objectives:

- To supplant or undermine Western and Chinese political, economic, and military influence in the region.
- To obtain, or deny to the West, air and naval access; to monitor US military activity; and to facilitate Soviet transport of assistance to friendly regimes.
- To respond to broader ideological imperatives of Marxism-Leninism by promoting pro-Soviet or leftist change that in turn supports Soviet claims of a growing shift in "the world correlation of forces" in Moscow's favor.
- To gain an enhanced role for Moscow in the resolution of regional issues, thereby reinforcing Soviet claims of superpower status and indispensability in the settlement of major international issues.
- To gain political support and influence among African states for Soviet policies and initiatives in international forums.
- To enhance over the longer term Soviet access to the region's strategic raw materials and to create the potential to hinder Western access to those resources.

- To facilitate the polarization of black versus white Africans, and to seek to isolate the United States as the defender of the white South African Government.

To achieve these aims in southern Africa, Moscow has sought to consolidate the regimes in Angola and Mozambique, to bring the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to power in Namibia, and, ultimately, to bring down the white minority regime in South Africa.

3. The USSR's key objectives in southern Africa over the next 18 months are:

- To ensure its continued influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique.
- To preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.
- To prevent a Namibian settlement linked to a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provide for a Namibia dominated by the SWAPO.
- To undermine South African- and US-sponsored regional initiatives with the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.
- To foster black African suspicions of South African and US "perfidy."

4. The Soviets' ability to pursue their objectives in southern Africa is enhanced by a number of advantages including:

- The fundamental, long-term regional conflict between the black Africans and the white minority regime in Pretoria.
- The availability of allies and surrogates—such as Cuba—that enable the USSR to play a role without committing substantial resources and personnel.
- Black African perceptions of a close relationship between the United States and South Africa.
- The capability to provide quickly and cheaply weapon systems to exploit black African security fears and needs.

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- An appealing blueprint for action and political organization for newly independent states and liberation movements.
 - The self-imposed limits on US military and covert involvement in southern Africa.
 - A number of political instruments and individuals cultivated and developed over a long period of time and generally responsive to Soviet bidding, such as the South African Communist Party (SACP), and pro-Soviet factions and individuals in current and former liberation movements.
5. The Soviets, however, are not without disadvantages, including:
- South Africa's military and economic dominance of the region, including Pretoria's willingness to take military action, directly and through third parties, against black African neighbors.
 - Moscow's unwillingness or inability to help address and resolve the fundamental economic dilemmas facing economically beleaguered black African states.
 - The recognized failure of the USSR to provide humanitarian relief in response to regional crises on a scale comparable to the West.
 - Moscow's unwillingness or inability to respond to emergency famine situations and the clear and damaging comparison with massive US humanitarian assistance.
 - The West's continuing dominant economic role in the region.
 - Traditional African cultural ties to the West.
 - African recognition of Soviet inability to broker negotiated solutions to regional conflicts.
 - Unattractiveness of the Soviet economy as a model for African development.

Soviet Involvement in Southern Africa

6. During the 1970s, the Soviets exploited major opportunities afforded by the collapse of the Portuguese empire, black African security fears, and the national liberation struggles in Rhodesia and, to a lesser degree, in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow's efforts are abetted by some 45,000 Cuban and East European military and civilian personnel in the region, primarily in Angola and Mozambique. (See the tables on pages 21 through 24 for a breakdown of

Soviet-Cuban-East European presence as well as data on Soviet military and economic assistance to the region since 1976.) The 30,000 to 35,000 Cuban troops in Angola remain essential to the efforts of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to defend against a growing insurgency threat.

Glossary

ANC. *African National Congress*. Insurgent South African political movement, banned in South Africa since 1960.

FRELIMO. *Front for the Liberation of Mozambique*. Former guerrilla movement led by Samora Machel that currently rules Mozambique.

MPLA. *Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola*. Former insurgent movement that currently rules Angola, led by Jose Eduardo dos Santos.

RENAMO. *National Resistance of Mozambique*. Mozambican insurgent group formerly backed by South Africa.

SACP. *South African Communist Party*. A Moscow-oriented party banned in South Africa since the 1950s that has extensive links to the African National Congress.

SWAPO. *South-West Africa People's Organization*. The major insurgent movement in Namibia.

UDF. *United Democratic Front*. Legal antigovernment multiracial association of some 600 organizations in South Africa formed in 1983.

UNITA. *National Union for the Total Independence of Angola*. Angolan insurgent movement led by Jonas Savimbi and backed by South Africa.

ZANU. *Zimbabwe African National Union*. Led by Robert Mugabe, this former guerrilla movement has emerged as the ruling and dominant political party since independence.

ZAPU. *Zimbabwe African People's Union*. Led by Joshua Nkomo. One of the major guerrilla groups that fought the white minority regime in Rhodesia before independence in 1980. Now an opposition party.

7. Moscow's political and ideological ties to the ruling leftist parties in Luanda and Maputo—formalized under Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation—help to institutionalize Soviet influence and presence.

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The sizable Soviet Bloc and Cuban presence—of central importance to Soviet interests and strategies—gives Moscow access to and influence in the military and civilian bureaucracies, in part by creating a dependence on the important technical services provided by these advisers. Various party-to-party accords and cadre training programs, for example, further enable the USSR to identify and cultivate strongly pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO).

8. Angola is central to Moscow's pursuit of its regional objectives. It affords the USSR entree and access to the region's remaining liberation movements in Namibia and South Africa, serving as a conduit for Soviet aid and training to SWAPO and African National Congress (ANC) insurgents. The Soviets also are capable of monitoring, and exploiting or creating, unrest in neighboring Zaire from Angola.

9. The USSR has extensive and regular access to air and naval facilities in Angola, and Luanda provides logistic support to the Soviet Navy's West Africa patrol and is a staging base for Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft. Although Mozambique does not permit Moscow as extensive access, Maputo continues to permit Soviet ship visits and port calls.

10. The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975-76 marks the start of Moscow's higher profile in southern Africa. Moscow's growing regional role was underscored by the development of arms supply relationships with Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, as well as material support for guerrillas during the Rhodesian war and for those now operating in Namibia and South Africa.

11. Beginning with the negotiated settlement of the Rhodesian conflict in December 1979, however, Moscow's regional influence began to level off: relations with Zambia did not appreciably expand, Robert Mugabe's electoral win over the Soviet-backed Joshua Nkomo checked Soviet inroads in independent Zimbabwe, and arm sales to Botswana failed to gain the Soviets any appreciable influence. Moreover, Pretoria's tough policies vis-a-vis the region's remaining national liberation movements further diminished Soviet opportunities. On the plus side, Moscow's growing involvement in Angola and Mozambique seemingly assured the Soviets of a continuing role in southern Africa.

12. The decisions by Angola and Mozambique in early 1984 to sign military disengagement and nonaggression pacts, respectively, with South Africa cast into question the USSR's role and influence in its two key

The Nkomati Accord

On 16 March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed a nonaggression pact stating that neither government would allow its territory to be used to prepare acts of violence against the other. In practical terms, Pretoria agreed to stop supporting the Mozambican National Resistance insurgents in return for Maputo's pledge to prevent guerrilla attacks from Mozambique against South Africa by the African National Congress.

The Lusaka Agreement

The agreement of 16 February 1984 between Angola and South Africa calls for the staged withdrawal of South African forces from southern Angola in exchange for an Angolan commitment not to allow the Namibian guerrillas of the South-West Africa People's Organization to operate in the area vacated by South Africa. Pretoria and Luanda agreed to establish a Joint Monitoring Commission to police the disengagement area and prevent SWAPO infiltration of northern Namibia.

strongholds. Angolan and Mozambican efforts to expand ties to the West in recent years have compounded Moscow's concerns about the viability and reliability of its key clients in southern Africa.

13. General Secretary Chernenko offered the most authoritative Soviet comment on these agreements in March 1984 when he implicitly expressed grudging approval of the accords but criticized Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African desires for peace and stability to impose their solutions on the region. Chernenko voiced doubts as to whether Angolan security and Namibian independence are "truly" guaranteed, and reaffirmed the USSR's support for Angola, Mozambique, and regional liberation movements. Soviet media commentaries further reflect Moscow's ambivalence. Political analyst Aleksandr Bovin, for example, candidly cited the factors and benefits that had induced Luanda and Maputo to reach agreements with Pretoria. Bovin nonetheless questioned the utility of the accords, saying it was "naive" to think that Pretoria's destabilization efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements."

14. Moscow has seized upon the stalled South African troop withdrawal from southern Angola and continued National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) activities in Mozambique to step up criticism of the Lusaka and Nkomati Accords. Soviet commentary has argued that these "violations" reflect Pretoria's real intention—to bring down the MPLA

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and FRELIMO regimes. These accounts consistently argue that the region's fundamental problems are all linked to the existence of the white minority regime in Pretoria—implying a need for continued armed struggle.

Angola

15. Angola remains Moscow's main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials explicitly state that Moscow has more credibility at stake in Angola than in Mozambique, and that the USSR is "in for the long haul" in support of the MPLA. The Soviets—concerned that the United States seeks to oust the MPLA from power and "cut the USSR out" of southern Africa—have expressed deep suspicions about US motives for wanting to broker a Namibian settlement. Soviet statements about "hanging tough" in Angola for several more years reflect this broader desire to counteract a US administration that the USSR perceives as trying to "push the Soviets back" around the globe.

16. At the same time, Soviet officials repeatedly have argued to US officials that neither the United States nor the USSR has "vital interests" at stake in southern Africa. In this vein, Moscow has further asserted that US-Soviet confrontations in the area need not develop and that southern African issues should not complicate broader, more important issues in US-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet officials have stated emphatically that Moscow has no intention of compromising on such basic positions as its opposition to apartheid and support to the MPLA government.

17. On balance, such comments suggest that the USSR clearly prefers a military stalemate that sustains Luanda's dependence upon Moscow to a settlement that could be perceived as a Soviet "withdrawal" under US pressure. New Soviet economic and military aid commitments to Angola substantiate Moscow's professed commitment to preserving the MPLA in power. For example, in 1982 the Soviets agreed to pledge \$2 billion in economic aid to Angola, but little has been delivered. On the military side, the Soviets have delivered impressive amounts of military equipment—valued at over \$1 billion—since 1983. During this period, the Soviets have upgraded Angolan military capabilities through the introduction of SA-8, SA-6, and SA-2 surface-to-air missile systems, MI-24/25 helicopter gunships, MIG-23 fighter aircraft, and SU-22 fighter-bombers into Angola, and deliveries of previously provided weapon systems continue at high levels. In addition, Soviet advisers have assumed a more active role in transport and logistics structures within the country.

18. Moscow probably sees continuing military support as a way to help turn around the worsening security situation and ensure its continued influence in Luanda. Also, this aid demonstrates Moscow's commitment and will strengthen the Soviet-backed hardliners in Luanda, thereby limiting President dos Santos's political maneuverability. Furthermore the provision of sophisticated weapon systems to Angola serves to bolster Soviet warnings to South Africa that future South African attacks will have a heavy cost.

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22. Although Moscow views the current Angolan talks with the United States and South Africa as a potential threat to its position, it remains convinced that South Africa is unwilling to relinquish Namibia to SWAPO rule and that this will ultimately preclude a settlement even if other related issues are resolved. In addition, the still-incomplete South African withdrawal from southern Angola has somewhat diminished the security threat to the MPLA government—the threat that first prompted the Soviets to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. Moreover, should the present situation persist, the Angolans and Cubans would be in a stronger position to focus their energies on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. Finally, while the Soviets may have misgivings about the Lusaka disengagement provisions constraining SWAPO military activity, preserving the regime in Luanda is a more important priority.

23. In this light, the Soviets continue to call for implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435² and to condemn any formal “linkage” formula that ties the South African presence in Namibia to the Cuban troop presence in Angola. In reality, however, they have tacitly accepted some linkage by publicizing proposals made by President dos Santos in September 1984—plans which call for a phased withdrawal of some 20,000 Cubans over a three-year period after UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 435 is initiated and the South Africans reduce their troop presence in Namibia to some 1,500.³

24. This is the first time such disclosures have appeared in authoritative Soviet and Cuban media, and the disclosures suggest that the USSR and Cuba see several benefits to going public with the “fine print” of Luanda’s current proposal. In particular, it places the burden of continuing the Namibian process upon Pretoria, pressures the United States to validate its claim to be an objective broker between South Africa and the black Africans, and enhances Angola’s image by demonstrating Luanda’s willingness to make real concessions—sending home 20,000 Cubans—in

² UNSCR 435 calls for a cease-fire, a phased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, and the establishment of a UN force to oversee preparations for Namibian elections.

³ See IIM 82-10003, *Moscow and the Namibia Peace Process*, April 1982.

pursuit of Namibian independence. As such, Moscow and Havana probably are pleased that dos Santos’s public disclosure makes it more difficult to conduct private negotiations. Moreover, the disclosure forced Pretoria to go public with its counterproposal. Moscow probably hopes the process will be complicated and that each side will find it difficult to make new concessions without losing face. The Soviets and Cubans may believe that these disclosures serve to lock dos Santos into his current position and limit his maneuverability as the negotiations develop further.

Soviet Views on UNITA

25. Increasing candor in the Soviet press about Angola’s precarious economic condition—caused in part by UNITA activities—further suggests that Moscow recognizes that the MPLA may have to take some dramatic steps to get out of an increasingly untenable position. Recent articles in *New Times*, *Za Rubezhom*, and *Komsomolskaya Pravda* noted Angola’s alarming predicament: that “60 percent of the country’s bridges and 90 percent of its transport facilities have been destroyed by the aggressors”; that “tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted in January 1984”; that “Luanda is experiencing a shortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of refugees from the south”; and that “not only the territorial integrity but the independence of the young republic has been endangered.” Such media revelations also probably are designed to signal the long-term nature of the Angolan problem and the continuing need for Soviet support.

26. The Soviets are wrestling with the question of UNITA’s future role in Angola. During the past year, Soviet officials privately acknowledged for the first time that neither side can prevail militarily and that peace can only be achieved through some form of internal reconciliation. The Soviets have not indicated any willingness, however, to support an MPLA effort to establish a dialogue with the insurgency—chiefly because the MPLA would be at a distinct disadvantage in such a situation because of UNITA’s present military and political strength. Moreover, Soviet officials across the board adamantly reject any MPLA deal with UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi who they apparently fear would easily dominate any such arrangement. At this time there is no evidence to indicate that this judgment does not reflect views of the MPLA leadership, particularly among the pro-Soviet faction.

27. We believe the Soviets thus see the continuation of the military struggle as their only real option until such time as Savimbi is either gone or UNITA’s

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strength is otherwise diminished. By the same token, Moscow sees a Cuban troop withdrawal before the military balance shifts in Luanda's favor as simply forcing the MPLA into a suicide pact.

Relations With SWAPO and the ANC

28. Recent diplomatic moves in Angola have spurred increased Soviet interaction with SWAPO leaders, and Moscow appears to be trying to stiffen SWAPO resolve against any temptation to strike a deal with Pretoria.

Such statements also add to the pressure on Luanda, since SWAPO leaders increasingly express the fear that Luanda will sell out SWAPO to achieve an accord with South Africa. Similarly, Nujoma's two-week stay in Moscow during the US-Angolan talks in October 1984 may have served to remind Luanda that Moscow is intent on protecting SWAPO's interests and stake in the ongoing negotiations.

29. For their parts, SWAPO and the ANC probably are concerned that Moscow may sacrifice their interests in order to strengthen its position in Luanda and Maputo. Although these liberation movements have been upgrading their ties to the Chinese, they will have little choice but to become even more dependent on the USSR should the Angolan and Mozambican agreements with South Africa take hold. Indeed, SWAPO and the ANC probably attach greater importance to Soviet backing than ever before since they may be able to translate Moscow's continued support to Luanda and Maputo into leverage for sustaining assistance to the liberation struggle.

30. Short of implementation of UNSCR 435, the Soviets probably prefer a protracted military stalemate in Namibia so they can establish greater influence with SWAPO. From Moscow's perspective, while a guerrilla strategy offers little hope of near-term success, it does succeed in prolonging regional tensions and black African antipathy toward Pretoria.

Mozambique

31. President Samora Machel's rapprochement with Pretoria in 1984 clearly undercuts Soviet interests and prestige and opens new opportunities for Western

inroads in Mozambique. More important, from Moscow's perspective, it diminishes the already limited capabilities of the ANC and thus obstructs the USSR's long-term objective of undermining the white minority regime in Pretoria. Moreover, the Nkomati Accord has significant implications for more important Soviet interests in Angola. One of Moscow's chief concerns about the accord has been that the successful settlement of FRELIMO's insurgency problem through negotiation could encourage the MPLA to do likewise.

32.

Moscow's aid commitments have not matched Maputo's economic needs, however, and the Soviets have shown no inclination to increase economic assistance enough to dissuade Machel from talking with the South Africans. In the past few years, for example, Moscow has failed to respond to Mozambican calls for greater economic aid and has rejected Maputo's application for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

33. Machel's willingness to reach an agreement with Pretoria most certainly was influenced by Mozambique's dismal economic prospects. Maputo's long-standing economic slide has been seriously exacerbated by expanded RENAMO activities and the onset in 1983 of a devastating famine. These security and economic difficulties presented Machel with his greatest crisis since independence, and in the face of Moscow's unwillingness to provide substantial economic assistance left him little option but to seek out new potential sources of help as well as to curtail South African support to RENAMO.

34. The Soviets have acquiesced in Machel's policy shift, at least in part because—according to Soviet officials—Moscow's stake and obligations in Mozambique are less than in Angola, where a Soviet and Cuban intervention brought to power—and sustains—the MPLA. Soviet prestige is not linked as closely to the survival of the Machel regime. Soviet influence is considerably less in Maputo than in Luanda;

35. Nevertheless, Moscow is unlikely to write off Mozambique. President Machel received high-level attention at the Andropov funeral in mid-February 1984 and the *Pravda* account of his meetings with Soviet Premier Tikhonov and Deputy Foreign Minister Il'ichev noted that prospects for further development of bilateral relations were favorable. Moreover,

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the Soviets are actively cultivating Mozambican military officials. A Mozambican military delegation was warmly received in Moscow in July 1984, and deliveries of previously contracted Soviet military equipment have continued since the accord with South Africa was signed. Moscow also recently agreed to sell Mozambique about half of the oil it requires for 1985.

Elsewhere in Southern Africa

36. The Soviets continue to seek to improve and bolster their bilateral ties to other states in the region. These efforts have taken on added significance since the signing of the Nkomati and Lusaka Accords in early 1984. While many African leaders may view the accords as limited tactical moves and are not inclined to attach broader significance to them,

Zimbabwe

37. The Soviets continue to seek improved ties with the Mugabe government. Still smarting from Nkomo's electoral defeat in 1980, Moscow has gradually expanded ties to Harare since 1981 by concluding a number of media, cultural, and trade accords. In July 1983, an agreement to establish a TASS link in Zimbabwe was signed as part of Harare's effort to present reporting of world events from both Eastern and Western perspectives. After a long delay, Zimbabwe also has opened an Embassy in Moscow. Moreover, after numerous postponements Prime Minister Mugabe may in the near future make his first visit to the USSR.

38. The Soviets also are continuing efforts to exploit and highlight differences between the United States and Zimbabwe. On Moscow's plus side, the Soviets appear encouraged by Mugabe's professed commitment to Marxism-Leninism, and in August 1984 they sent a delegation to the Zimbabwe African National Union's (ZANU's) second party congress—described by *Pravda* as an "important stage for Zimbabwe's development along the path of independence and social progress." The Soviets also gave great media play to US reduction of economic aid to Harare following its abstention in the UN vote on the Korean Airline shootdown in September 1983.

39. The Soviets will confront longstanding ZANU memories of Soviet support to the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) movement during the liberation struggle. As in other countries, possible

Soviet offers of military aid could lead to greater Soviet influence, although the Zimbabwean Government to date has favored British, North Korean, and other suppliers over the Soviets.

Zambia

40. Soviet influence in Zambia remains limited and is unlikely to increase significantly in the short term because of Zambia's need for massive economic assistance and the lessened security threat perceived from South Africa. Despite the Soviet arms relationship established with Zambia in 1979-80, Moscow's position in Zambia has not substantially improved. The Soviets maintain an advisory and maintenance presence in Lusaka with regard to MIG-21s, but this relationship has not given Moscow significant political influence or leverage. The lessening of Zambia's external security problems following the conclusion of the Rhodesian war has allowed President Kaunda to pursue his longstanding policy of nonalignment. Indeed, Kaunda's willingness to talk and negotiate with Pretoria—as underscored by his role in facilitating the disengagement accord between Angola and South Africa, as well as similar talks between SWAPO and South Africa—reflects a divergence in Zambian and Soviet interests. Following Kaunda's hosting of the meeting in May 1984 between SWAPO and the Namibian internal parties, for example, Moscow turned down his request to visit the USSR. Kaunda's desire to play the elder statesman and regional peacemaker has probably further diminished Soviet short-term hopes for greater influence in Zambia.

41. Domestically, the Soviets have had limited success establishing links with various groups in Zambia. Apart from the standard Friendship Society set up in Lusaka, the Soviet Communist Party has an interparty accord with Zambia's ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). This has led to a number of party-to-party exchanges and delegation visits since 1981. In addition, some members of Kaunda's inner circle of advisers are known to be pro-Soviet in outlook. Moscow probably views these links as a useful mechanism for identifying and cultivating individuals within the ruling elite.

Botswana and Lesotho

42. The Soviets have stepped up efforts to cultivate Botswana and Lesotho as well as other states contiguous to South Africa. These moves have had only mixed success, however, because of the ties these states have

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with the West and their fear of South African reprisals. Moscow attempted to build an arms relationship with Gaborone in the early 1980s, and in 1981 signed a [redacted] arms accord, primarily for armored personnel carriers and SA-7s. However, Botswana's dissatisfaction with the quality and maintenance of equipment led Gaborone to send the Soviet support personnel home when the one-year service contract expired. Nevertheless, Moscow has succeeded in establishing a large diplomatic presence in Gaborone; there reportedly are some 40 persons at the Soviet Embassy.

43. Future Soviet opportunities may well depend on the state of relations between Botswana and South Africa. Recent South African pressures for a "security pact" have irritated President Masire, [redacted]

[redacted] For their part the Soviets have attempted to avoid antagonizing President Masire, [redacted]

44. Lesotho's Prime Minister Jonathan has made a somewhat dramatic "turn to the East" since 1983 in order to draw Western attention to his country's problems with South Africa and to elicit additional foreign aid and assistance from all sources. The Soviets have seized on these initiatives to expand their links with Lesotho. A Soviet delegation headed by a member of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations visited Maseru in June 1984 to discuss economic and technical cooperation issues. In August 1984, Lesotho's Minister for Information signed a media cooperation accord with TASS officials in Moscow. A landing rights agreement for Aeroflot flights is reportedly soon to be concluded as well. The Soviets presumably would post officials and technicians to Lesotho to oversee implementation of these accords in the near future. Lesotho's Foreign Minister Makhele also visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries. Prime Minister Jonathan has also acknowledged the departure to the USSR of some 38 students in late August 1984.

45. Pretoria probably will move to check the possibility of major Soviet gains in Botswana and Lesotho. Pretoria's preemptive moves against local ANC members in Lesotho leave little doubt about its willingness to take forceful measures to combat perceived security problems in neighboring countries. Moreover, South Africa's links to local insurgents of the Lesotho Liberation Army probably will deter Jonathan from any major expansion of relations with the Soviet Union.

South Africa

46. Moscow views the undermining of the white minority regime in Pretoria as a long-term proposition. Inasmuch as Moscow has no formal relations with Pretoria, it has no opportunity to use a diplomatic presence to assess the local situation or to contact leftists within the country itself. Nonetheless, the USSR has sought to ensure itself a role by cultivating various groups that seek the violent overthrow of the regime—such as the ANC and the SACP—by providing training and arms.

47. The Soviets probably will demonstrate flexibility as new opportunities emerge for change in South Africa. [redacted]

[redacted] that the USSR is broadening its interest in groups beyond the banned ANC to such organizations as the United Democratic Front (UDF). In this context, it is noteworthy that a Soviet scholarly journal recently described the UDF as being "consonant in many respects" with the ANC program. The same article argued, moreover, that the reason South Africa had moderated its foreign policy was to concentrate on the growing liberation struggle within its borders.

Disinformation and Propaganda

48. In a region where the Soviets have limited influence over events, Moscow has relied heavily on propaganda and disinformation to convince black governments that neither South Africa nor the United States can be trusted. These efforts generally play on black African fears of Pretoria and seek to undermine US negotiation efforts. Over the past few years, Moscow has targeted much disinformation about alleged US-UNITA collaboration at Luanda, presumably to raise doubts about the intentions of the United States in its dialogue with the MPLA. Most disinformation efforts try to portray Washington and Pretoria as military and political allies. In December 1983, for example, a story—later followed by a denial after disclosure that the piece was produced by a Soviet news agency—surfaced in the Zimbabwe *Herald* alleging that the United States planned to test and deploy cruise missiles in South Africa. The *Herald* also fell prey to a Soviet forgery that indicated that Washington was recruiting helicopter pilots to serve in South Africa. Another forgery claimed that the United States had offered to sell Pretoria F-5 fighter aircraft.

49. As part of this propaganda effort, the USSR has reinforced black African antipathy toward Pretoria by publicizing the various aspects of South African apartheid policies, focusing particularly on those issues

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where they share a common position with the black African states. The Soviets, for example, promoted a joint ANC-SWAPO press conference in Mali to discuss the plight of blacks in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet media also have highlighted the calls of all the black African leaders that South Africa implement the UN plan for Namibia without linking it to a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola.

Regional Developments and Likely Soviet Responses: The Next 18 Months

Angola

50. *Scenario: Deteriorating Security Situation.* Faced with a situation in which there is a continuing deterioration in the MPLA's position vis-a-vis UNITA and/or South Africa, with no prospect of a decisive shift in the military balance, we believe Soviet options are limited and that Moscow would continue its current tack of bolstering Angola's defense capabilities. Since early 1983, for example, impressive levels of arms have been delivered by the USSR, and Cuban combat forces have been augmented by at least 5,000 troops.

51. A steady or more rapid deterioration of the country's economic infrastructure would create serious problems for the MPLA and its Soviet patrons. The MPLA could face a crisis in confidence within the local populace, if faced with increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key economic sectors, such as the Cabinda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these circumstances, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide additional technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combat sabotage activity.

52. A dramatic military shift in UNITA's favor within the next 18 months, however, probably would force the Soviets to urge the Cubans to assume a more direct role in the fighting as well as to request that additional Cuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moscow would be likely to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such as MI-24/25 Hinds and fighter aircraft, in an attempt to reestablish a military equilibrium. The Soviets probably would also increase their advisory presence and play a larger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations.

53. A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead the Soviets to respond—as they have in the past—with an upgrading and

strengthening of Angolan defense capabilities. The Soviets also would seize the occasion to mount a massive propaganda campaign aimed at exposing South African and US "perfidy." They would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime.

54. A final Soviet decision on how far Moscow is prepared to go in supporting the MPLA regime probably has yet to be made. Comments from Soviet officials suggest that Moscow does not believe Angola is of such importance as to warrant the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover, Moscow realizes that only massive numbers of Soviet forces could decisively alter the military balance, and even then, as Afghanistan has proved, such actions could not guarantee the defeat of UNITA forces.⁴

The Cuban Factor

55. The Cubans and Cuba's response remain wild cards in all scenarios. Although Havana is likely to accede ultimately to Moscow's wishes, a stepped-up Cuban role does raise the possibility of social and political unrest in Cuba. Such an eventuality, together with bleak military prospects in Angola, could cause Castro to reevaluate Havana's commitment to Luanda.

56. There are indications that Havana is reevaluating the situation in Angola, and some Cuban officials have acknowledged that Havana might be amenable to a withdrawal of some of its forces from Angola if MPLA control were assured. Castro appears sensitive to the domestic liabilities of continued involvement in Angola as Cuban casualties have mounted in recent years. Moreover, in the fall of 1984, authoritative Cuban media released all the details of President dos Santos's proposals for a phased Cuban troop withdrawal once the implementation of UNSCR 435 is begun; such disclosures have heightened popular expectations concerning the return of troops from an increasingly unpopular foreign adventure.

57. At the same time, however, Castro is likely to resist a total withdrawal or other actions that would be

⁴ The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, believes that Moscow has not ruled out a more direct Soviet military role in Angola, although the USSR probably would stop short of sending Soviet ground combat forces. In his view, if additional Cuban troops and Soviet arms and advisers were unable to halt a further deterioration of the MPLA's military situation, and its survival became seriously threatened, the chances of additional Soviet intervention—possibly including air, air defense, or military security forces—would increase. If undertaken, such action would be intended not to defeat the opposition militarily but to show Moscow's commitment, to free up additional Angolan/Cuban forces for combat, and to exert pressure on the parties involved to reach a political settlement.

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perceived as a Cuban "defeat" in Angola. By supporting dos Santos's most recent proposals for a partial—and phased—withdrawal of Cuban forces from southern Angola, Havana has signaled that it is prepared to "hang tough," at least over the short term, and to hold to maintenance of a significant "residual" troop presence in northern Angola.

58. *Scenario: Diplomatic Breakthrough on Namibia.* An agreement by the dos Santos coalition to a total withdrawal of the Cubans, intended to bring about a broader Namibian settlement, could prompt drastic action by the Soviets to derail a settlement. The departure of most of the Cuban combat troops would cost the Soviets much of their leverage in Luanda—unless the MPLA continued to push for a "military solution" to the UNITA problem that would sustain a heavy dependence upon the USSR for military support. Moscow, however, could not be sanguine about the MPLA's prospects, given Luanda's inability to defeat UNITA even with 30,000 to 35,000 Cubans on its side.

59. If the MPLA reached a consensus to take action on the US Namibian package and come to a "political solution" that included reconciliation with UNITA, the Soviets could:

- Step up disinformation and other active measures to exploit Luanda's fears that Pretoria and Washington are working together to promote a UNITA seizure of power.
- Press SWAPO to increase activities inside Namibia in hopes of turning Pretoria against a Namibian settlement.
- Acquiesce to MPLA-UNITA reconciliation talks, with the objective of entrapping and eliminating Savimbi and his lieutenants.
- Encourage a coup in Luanda, in hopes that, if the pro-Soviet hardliners came to power, Angola would take a more confrontational approach toward South Africa and the SWAPO issue.

Each of these options has inherent limitations and varying degrees of risk. To the extent the options require African involvement or acquiescence, Moscow has limited ability to influence events. Disinformation could have some impact, given the historical suspicion and distrust between South Africa and its black African neighbors. On the other hand, it would probably be ineffective if both Luanda and Pretoria were determined to reach a settlement. The Namibian insurgents might welcome additional Soviet arms support to step up their activities, but Moscow would have difficulty supplying SWAPO without Angolan cooper-

ation. Moreover, a Soviet attempt to subvert a Namibian accord that enjoyed the support of most Africans could jeopardize Soviet credibility and equities among other black African states.

60. Elimination of the UNITA leadership seems highly unlikely. Savimbi is unlikely to give his opponents such an opportunity, having witnessed MPLA assassination of UNITA officials during the period of the Alvor accords in 1975 when both sides ostensibly were cooperating.

61. A coup by MPLA hardliners could bring to power more pro-Soviet leaders dependent on Soviet aid to hold power. Given the complex of factors—race, tribe, ideology, and personality—that shape MPLA politics, however, Moscow could not be certain that even a successful coup would have the desired result. Tensions between the contesting MPLA factions could further weaken the military and thus strengthen the hand of Savimbi and his UNITA insurgents. Should the coup fail, Moscow could find itself with almost no influence in Angola. Given these considerations, we believe it unlikely that the Soviets would encourage such a coup.

62. Any measures the Soviets pursue would fail to take Angola beyond the basic dilemmas that prompted Luanda to respond to South African overtures in the first place. If the USSR succeeds in derailing current negotiations, South Africa has the option of resuming pressure on Luanda by reentering southern Angola and stepping up aid to UNITA. This, in turn, would create a security crisis much like the one that prompted Moscow to send record levels of arms to Luanda in 1983. While Moscow may be prepared to up the military ante, as it warned the South Africans in November 1983, the Soviets—whose financial costs are minimized by Luanda's oil earnings—are unlikely to pick up the economic assistance burden if the Angolan economy becomes a total shambles.

63. On balance we believe that if the Angolans resolve their internal debate on the Cuban withdrawal and decide to proceed with the US package settlement—even if it leads to a reconciliation with UNITA—the Soviets would try to dissuade them, but would ultimately bow to their wishes. Under these circumstances, Moscow would seek to make the best of a bad situation. It would claim that Namibian independence represented a victory for the USSR and Cuba. The Soviets would presumably seek to ensure MPLA dominance in the coalition with UNITA and to expand their contacts with at least the MPLA faction in the coalition. They would try to protect their military access to facilities in Angola, to retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA to

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retain at least a core Cuban troop presence. While continuing to cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independent Namibia—assuming a SWAPO electoral win—in pursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

In Mozambique

64. Moscow's options in Mozambique have been considerably reduced since Machel's dramatic about-face in his dealings with South Africa. Nevertheless, we believe the Soviets will try to sustain the military assistance relationship—as they have in Tanzania and Guinea—despite the recent setback to their interests. The Soviets, for example, accorded Machel a friendly reception during his trip to Moscow in February 1984 and have continued deliveries of previously contracted military equipment, including MI-24/25 helicopters, since the accords with Pretoria were signed.

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65. There are indications that Machel is seeking to further reduce—and perhaps eliminate—Mozambique's dependence on the USSR for military equipment and advisory support.

A reconciliation between FRELIMO and RENAMO insurgent leaders would abet this general trend and further erode Moscow's overall position in Mozambique. Reconciliation talks in October 1984 broke down, however, and prospects for resumption appear questionable.

66. The Soviets are likely to intensify efforts to play on Machel's domestic and external vulnerabilities as he tries to expand his ties to South Africa, the West, and China. The Soviets could threaten a cutoff of military assistance and, while it is unlikely that Moscow would stop the military aid program altogether, this suggestion would serve to remind Machel of the need to consider Soviet interests as he proceeds in his diplomacy with South Africa.

67. Moscow also is likely to seek to pressure Machel by bolstering and encouraging hardline elements within FRELIMO and disparaging his leadership to other black African leaders.

68. Moscow probably recognizes that dramatic changes—such as the ouster of Machel by party hardliners—could benefit RENAMO and lead to renewed South African economic and military pressures on Maputo. While such a move might strengthen the pro-Soviet proclivities of the regime, it could also lead to renewed requests for major new Soviet military and economic assistance commitments necessary to offset potential South African military and economic countermeasures. Given the Soviets' record in Mozambique, we do not believe Moscow would fulfill these requests for major economic aid.

69. Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati Accord with South Africa will break down. The Soviets have long predicted that South Africa would not cease supporting RENAMO, and they see Maputo's growing frustration over the insurgency as evidence that the Mozambicans are finally realizing that Nkomati is not working to their interests. Soviet propaganda will continue to focus on the "bankruptcy" of the Nkomati Accord and allegations of continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time, Moscow hopes that the continuing military challenge from the insurgency will strengthen hardline elements in FRELIMO and cause Machel to abandon his commitment to Nkomati.

Possible Openings in Zimbabwe and Zambia

70. Widespread instability in Matabeleland, spawned by well-equipped dissident guerrillas or a perceived increased threat from South Africa, could alter Mugabe's arm's-length attitude toward Moscow. While Mugabe would not overcome his general distrust and wariness of the USSR, stemming from past Soviet support for the rival ZAPU, a deteriorating security situation could enhance the appeal of relatively cheap Soviet arms and fast delivery times. The Soviets reportedly sent one shipment of small arms to Harare in March 1983.

71. Failure to achieve a Namibian-Angolan settlement would have some effect in Zambia favorable to Soviet interests, as disillusionment with US diplomatic efforts, renewed political support to SWAPO and ANC by Lusaka, and security fears of possible renewed South African paramilitary actions against SWAPO and ANC elements in Zambia could motivate Lusaka to seek additional Soviet military assistance.

Scenarios With SWAPO and the ANC

72. South Africa's diplomatic maneuvers and strains in Soviet relations with Angola and Mozambique will

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continue to complicate Moscow's efforts to channel additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC. Nevertheless, Moscow is likely to encourage SWAPO and the ANC to step up their activities, partly in hopes of souring South Africa on prospective agreements with Luanda or Maputo.

73. Such efforts have little chance of success, however, if Pretoria and Luanda and Maputo are intent on reaching a settlement. The Angolans and the Mozambicans are likely to suspect a Soviet hand in any future actions by SWAPO or the ANC—such as terrorist attacks or bombings in Namibia or South Africa—that might undermine their accords with Pretoria. Moscow's public emphasis on the need to continue the liberation struggle is likely to compound such suspicions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Similar problems for the Soviets could arise in other southern African states, which, despite their public professions of solidarity with SWAPO and the ANC, are reluctant to provoke South African reprisals. In turn, the ability of SWAPO and the ANC to continue the armed struggle will be seriously hampered without access to camps and transit points in Angola, Mozambique, or other southern African states.

Outlook and Implications for the United States

74. Despite the adverse trends of recent years, the Soviets will work actively to maintain their position in Angola and Mozambique while seeking new opportunities elsewhere in southern Africa. As in the past, Moscow's main weapon will be continued military assistance to Luanda and Maputo. Concurrently, the USSR will move quietly, behind the scenes, through pro-Soviet elements in Luanda and Maputo to sow suspicions about South African and US initiatives. This approach reflects Moscow's belief that South African intransigence ultimately will destroy efforts to achieve a regional peace and that serious insurgency problems will sustain Angolan and Mozambican dependence upon Soviet military and security assistance.

75. At the same time, the USSR will look for new opportunities to build influence in the region. Given the area's inherent volatility and current economic situation, such openings could develop quickly and with little advance warning. Although recent overtures to Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Lesotho have had only limited success, increased security tensions with South

Africa could make these regimes more receptive to Soviet offers of military and technical assistance.

76. On the other hand, continued economic hard times in the area, coupled with Moscow's failure to provide substantive economic assistance, will work against Soviet efforts to solidify long-term influence. Persistent famine in Mozambique—or its outbreak elsewhere in the region—will only serve to highlight for economically beleaguered black African states Moscow's lack of economic help and make more attractive a "turn to the West." As such, the prospect of increased Western economic assistance to and investment in the region will remain perhaps the West's most powerful lure and counter to Soviet moves.

77. To the extent that the black Africans and Pretoria seriously participate in US-brokered solutions to regional problems, Moscow's position will be further undermined. New US and Western openings are not without risk, however, and the collapse or failure of current negotiations could seriously damage US credibility. Washington also will be susceptible to charges that it merely sought to protect its interests in South Africa, and deeply held black African perceptions that the United States exercises considerable leverage over Pretoria will fuel suspicions about US motives should South Africa drag out negotiations or initiate new military pressure to promote its regional objectives. In this situation, the Soviets could find a receptive audience by reminding black Africans of Moscow's earlier warnings about the futility of cooperating with Washington.

78. Any US diplomatic successes also will heighten black African expectations. Washington, for example, will face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of the United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new opportunities as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

79. Black Africans will look to the West for increased economic assistance. Greater economic involvement with the West could lead Angola and Mozambique to adopt a more truly nonaligned posture, further reducing Soviet influence. However, the web of political and ideological accords and continued security ties to the USSR is extensive and will assure the Soviets some degree of presence and influence. Short of the demise of the MPLA or FRELIMO governments, this relationship with Moscow is unlikely to change dramatically unless Western powers are willing to provide—on a par with and at competitive terms—the military and security aid currently provided by Moscow or are successful in reducing the need for such assistance.

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Table 1
Southern Africa: Communist Military Assistance, 1976-84

Million US \$

	Angola	Botswana	Mozambique	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
USSR						
1976						
Agreements	415	— ^a	131	—	2	—
Deliveries	64	—	2	35	9	—
1977						
Agreements	38	—	41	192	30	—
Deliveries	77	—	18	36	11	—
1978						
Agreements	260	—	—	—	—	—
Deliveries	143	—	105	30	10	—
1979						
Agreements	33	—	141	10	192	—
Deliveries	99	—	55	190	11	—
1980						
Agreements	13	7	—	79	10	—
Deliveries	137	—	50	39	178	—
1981						
Agreements	157	—	—	—	—	—
Deliveries	248	7	55	33	11	—
1982						
Agreements	185	—	202	—	—	—
Deliveries	322	NA	117	2	—	—
1983						
Agreements	805	—	150	18	—	—
Deliveries	561	—	240	2	—	—
1984 (January-June)						
Agreements	450	—	—	—	—	—
Deliveries	450	—	145	6	—	—

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Table 1 (continued)
Southern Africa: Communist Military Assistance, 1976-84

Million US \$

	Angola	Botswana	Mozambique	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
Eastern Europe						
1976						
Agreements	20	—	4	4	—	—
Deliveries	1	—	1	—	—	—
1977						
Agreements	85	—	20	—	—	—
Deliveries	76	—	10	4	—	—
1978						
Agreements	48	—	14	32	1	—
Deliveries	52	—	22	18	1	—
1979						
Agreements	32	—	36	—	—	—
Deliveries	25	—	24	14	—	—
1980						
Agreements	50	—	41	48	48	—
Deliveries	4	—	29	10	3	—
1981						
Agreements	5	—	—	—	—	—
Deliveries	25	—	15	10	24	—
1982						
Agreements	21	—	32	—	NA	NA
Deliveries	23	—	11	10	13	—
1983						
Agreements	13	—	7	—	—	—
Deliveries	8	—	2	—	—	—
1984						
Agreements	36	—	1	—	—	—
Deliveries	6	—	7	10	—	—

^a Dash indicates none.

Note: The only extensions of military assistance from Cuba were directed toward Angola, in 1976, 1977, and 1983. The figures for deliveries in those years are \$117 million, \$14 million, and \$22 million, respectively.

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Table 2
Southern Africa: Communist Military
Technicians and Troops,
Third Quarter 1984

	Number of Persons ^a		
	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Angola	800 to 1,200	500	30,000 to 35,000
Botswana	0	0	0
Mozambique	800	0	800
Tanzania	65	0	NA
Zambia	50	NA	0
Zimbabwe	0	0	0

^a Minimum estimate of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more, rounded to the nearest 5.

Table 3
Southern Africa: Communist Economic
Technicians, 1983

	Number of Persons ^a		
	USSR	Eastern Europe	Cuba
Angola	1,500	2,000	6,000
Botswana	0	0	0
Mozambique	1,000	1,375	1,000
Tanzania	100	100	150
Zambia	250	155	0
Zimbabwe	0	40	0

^a Minimum estimates of number present for one month or more, rounded to nearest 5.

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Table 4
Southern Africa: Communist Economic Extensions, 1975-83

Million US \$

	Angola	Botswana	Mozambique	Tanzania	Zambia	Zimbabwe
1975						
USSR	—	—	14	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	27	—	—	—
1976						
USSR	26	—	42	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	22	—	18	—	—	—
1977						
USSR	10	—	5	18	—	—
Eastern Europe	NA ^a	—	24	—	—	—
1978						
USSR	2	—	—	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	76	—	2	30	20	—
1979						
USSR	NEGL	—	—	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	—	21	64	—
1980						
USSR	—	—	67	—	—	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	2	—	32	—
1981						
USSR	—	—	45	—	6	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	80	—	—	—
1982						
USSR	400	—	5	5	—	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	10	10	—	2
1983						
USSR	—	—	16	—	9	—
Eastern Europe	—	—	—	—	—	30

^a NA=Information not available.

Note: Figures for Cuban extensions are not cited, as Cuban aid is negligible.

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